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EXECUTIVE BRIEF
The Past and  
the Hopeful Future 
of Vietnam’s 
Economy
ietna m—w it h its coa st l ine 
extending over 3,400 kilometres and 
comprising thousands of islands—has 
high development potential. The nation 
enjoys strong national cohesion and social 
stability. Despite hosting over 50 ethnic 
groups, religious and ethnic conflict is not 
of much concern. Moreover, 65 percent of 
its population is of working age, there is a 
high literacy rate, a growing middle class 
and an attractive domestic market. And yet, 
I believe that Vietnam has to aggressively 
continue reforming if it is to achieve its full 
potential. Vietnam has to restructure its 
economy—moving to higher value-added 
products and services, reorganising 
its institutions, shifting to a genuine 
meritocracy, and supporting innovation.
Reform and integration are key for tapping Vietnam’s 
economic potential.
By Le Dang Doanh
An economy in transition 
In the last 30 years, Vietnam has 
undertaken bold reforms to move away 
from a centrally-planned, Soviet-moulded 
economic system—one that inhibited 
the growth of the private sector and 
tried to centralise every economic 
activity within the administration. But 
to understand the Vietnamese economy 
today, it is important to appreciate the 
nation’s history. 
Vietnam was part of French Indochina 
from 1887 until France’s 1954 defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu. Under the 1954 
Geneva Accords, the country was divided 
into the communist North and anti-
communist South. In 1975, Vietnam was 
reunited under communist rule. After 
re-unification, North Vietnam tried to 
impose the same socio-economic model 
on the South, albeit with little success. 
While central planning was useful 
during the war, it seemed inefficient 
in peacetime. 
For instance, the socialist view had, at 
first, collectivised the farms and dictated 
a fixed price for purchasing crops such 
as rice. But thereafter, due to soaring 
inflation, the price soon became less 
than the cost of production—so the more 
the farmer produced, the more he lost. 
As a result, Vietnam began moving from 
a highly productive agrarian economy 
to a crop importing one, and the Soviet 
Union had to provide huge assistance 
to Vietnam. As per my calculations, the 
V
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GDP of Vietnam in 1975 was around US$2.5 billion, and Soviet assistance contributed 
an additional US$2 billion! This created a false sense of economic success for the 
Vietnamese leadership. 
 Over the next decade or so, Vietnam experienced little economic growth, largely 
on account of closed economic policies. But as the Soviet Union began to collapse and 
its financial assistance dried up, the Vietnamese economy too began to break down as 
there were insufficient funds to import essential commodities such as oil, fertiliser and 
steel. In order to survive, the Vietnamese authorities had to shift to a market economy. In 
1986, the country introduced the ‘Doi Moi’ or economic renovation policy—a commitment 
to increased economic liberalisation and structural reforms necessary to modernise 
the economy.
And I believe these reforms have been largely successful. Poverty levels have dropped 
significantly. At the time of the reforms, over 60 percent of Vietnam was living in 
poverty (based on the World Bank’s criterion of living on less than US$1.25 per day). 
But by 2010, this had been reduced to around 12 percent—a truly impressive achievement 
(refer to Figure 1). 
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FIGuRE 1 Source: UNDP, Hanoi, Author’s analysis
The reforms incentivised the farmers, who were given packages of land to 
grow their own crops, and to freely sell their product at market prices. This led 
to an earnings increase of as high as 150 to 300 percent over the two decades since 
Doi Moi was introduced. Vietnam was transformed from a crop importer to an 
exporter of rice, fish, cashews, black pepper, coffee and others. So in the agricultural 
sector, the success story has been quite obvious.
As for industry, the government has been promoting private sector development 
by making it easier to do business. Let me give an example. Prior to 1999, a 
businessman would need to provide a plethora of documents and get permission from the 
chairman of a province before commencing an enterprise. The model was similar to 
the Company Law followed by France 
and was a great impediment to the 
development of the private sector. 
But in 1999, while I was the head of 
the Central Institute of Economic 
Management, we conducted a study 
and found that there were more than 
300 licences and permits—most of 
which did nothing other than producing 
unnecessa r y bureaucratic burden. 
Since then, we have assisted the prime 
minister in cancel ling 286 such 
licenses. Some of these were replaced by 
‘business conditions’. So for instance, if 
you wanted to open a gasoline station, 
a condition would necessitate the 
acquisition of a permit concerning fire 
and environmental protection. The 
condition clearly lays out what materials 
need to be submitted to the authorities in 
order to obtain the necessary permission, 
and officials have little scope to harass 
applicants for additional documents. 
Hence, we successfully introduced a 
very liberal Enterprise Law, and I believe 
this has contributed immensely to the 
growth in Vietnam’s economy—in both the 
agricultural and private sectors.
Gdp GrowTh 
1997-98 was the time of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, and the per capita GDP growth rate 
began to slow (refer to Figure 2).
 In 2007, Vietnam joined the World 
Trade Organization, which provided a 
boost to the reform drive. Subsequently, 
there was a huge inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) into the securities 
market. The government also began 
a llowing state-owned companies to 
diversify their investments. Authority was 
further decentralised from the centre to 
the provinces, and was combined with a 
system to measure provincial performance 
based on GDP growth. The provinces 
found that the easiest way to increase GDP 
was to sell land. Consequently, minerals 
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FIGuRE 2 Source: Vietnam General Statistics Office
and forestry were commercialised, and the 
provinces soon began competing to attract 
foreign investment—instead of investing 
in science, technology and developing 
human capital. There was a push for easy 
money to speculate in real estate and 
securities. As a result, 2008-09 became 
a period of soaring inflation—during a real 
estate bubble, prices went up by as much as 
ten times. By 2011, inflation had reached 
23 percent.
The government had to reduce the 
money supply and credit supply to cool 
the economy, and in February 2011, 
it focused its policies towards stabilising 
the economy, rather than striving for 
higher economic growth, which had 
fuelled inflation.
The economy has since recovered—
but is still below its past 10-year average. 
Today, Vietnam’s economy faces a secular 
decline in growth rates (refer to Figure 3). 
There is now an urgency to continue 
on the reform path — externally integrating 
with the rest of the world, and internally to 
make it easier to do business.
Real gdP gRowTh RaTe (in PeRcenT)— 
1990 To 2013
vieTnam’s economy faces The longesT decline since Đổi mới
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FIGuRE 4 Source: Author’s analysis
Bold measures to 
integrate with the world
Vietnam’s integration with the rest of the 
world is so far impressive. It has joined 
the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), signed bilateral trade 
agreements with the U.S. and several 
other countries (refer to Figure 4), and 
is now negotiating to join the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).1 If all goes 
well, Vietnam will soon have signed free 
trade agreements with 55 economies 
in the world—ma k ing it a pioneer 
in integration.
Overall, Vietnam can expect to earn 
some additional GDP growth from the TPP 
and the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), while the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP)2 will 
result in tough competition with China. 
Figure 5 shows the agenda of the 
integration process in times to come.
In my opinion, Vietnam will benefit 
more from the TPP than from the AEC. 
Being a primarily agrarian economy, 
Vietnam will compete with all the AEC 
member countries, with the exception 
of Singapore. It will have to compete 
with Thailand on farm products, with 
Cambodia on garments, and with 
Indonesia on cars. But if Vietnam joins 
the TPP, it will enjoy complementary 
efficiencies with many more advanced 
economies such as the U.S., Japan and 
Chile. Exports of products, such as 
rice to the U.S., are expected to rise 
exponentially once tariff rates drop 
to zero post-TPP. Many of Vietnam’s 
competitors are outside the TPP, 
giving the country considerable trade 
advantage (refer to Figure 5). Hence 
Vietnam’s eagerness to sign the 
TPP and restructure its economy so 
that it can be prepared for future 
competition, and benefit from the 
common market and lower restrictions 
on movement of labour. 
>60% 
in poverty−1986 
12% 
in poverty−2010
Internal reforms, making 
it easier to do business,  
are a must 
If we review the World Bank report for 
ease of doing business (benchmarked 
to June 2014), it becomes apparent 
that there is a long way to go. Out of 
the 189 countries in the report, Vietnam 
is ranked 78 overall.
Similarly, on the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness 
Index for 2014-2015, Vietnam is ranked 
68 out of 144 economies, after its 
neighbours Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia (refer to Figure 6). 
Hence there is much room for 
improvement, and Vietnam needs to 
continue its reforms, or else it faces the 
risk of falling into the middle-income trap, 
where productivity falls behind rising 
earnings and costs.
If we look specifically within 
ASEAN (refer to Figure 7), the global 
competitive index of Singapore is 
the best. Vietnam has advantages in 
terms of its market size, health and 
primary education, and labour market 
efficiency—but suffers from infrastructure 
issues, and deficiencies in higher 
education, technical readiness and 
business sophistication.
In the past, the government did 
not want to recognise the relevancy of 
these rankings and insisted on 
producing their own rankings to 
convince themselves that the results 
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Economic growth is stagnating, and Vietnam is 
growing below its potential. Restructuring and reform 
of the economy must be urgently implemented.
Vietnamese businesses must be linked to the global 
value chain.
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former President of CIEM, Hanoi, is an 
independent economist, member of the  
Vietnam Association of Economists, and visiting 
Fellow of Hanoi Economic College, Hanoi 
National University
were good. But they have now publicly 
accepted the World Bank and WEF 
rankings, and issued Resolution 19—a 
policy to improve competitiveness 
and reduce the ranking gap between 
Vietnam and the ASEAN-6.3 
The intention and determination 
is welcome—but how can the public 
institutions be reformed such that 
they become less of an administrative 
body and more of a cooperative, 
pro-business development body? How 
can the bureaucracy be pushed to 
promote innovation a nd motivate 
businesses to invest in science 
and technology?
What must be done next?
The situation in Vietnam is quite 
challenging. Economic growth is still 
based on resource-related industries and 
low value-added processing. Labour costs 
remain low (monthly pay for manufacturing 
workers  in Vietnam is roughly 43 percent of 
that in China4), so the economy is currently 
competitive and FDI is flowing in. 
However, Vietnam must move 
from a low-wage economy to one that 
comprises a highly skilled, well-trained 
and sophisticated labour force. Samsung 
is an example of a corporation successfully 
tapping Vietnam’s potential. Vietnam is 
their largest manufacturing centre in the 
world, and the company has also established 
an R&D centre here. Recently Samsung 
called for 170 supporting products and 
services to be provided from Vietnam. 
About 1,000 Vietnamese companies 
applied to be part of the initiative, 
but only 12 were selected, and each 
needs to invest around US$12-15 million 
to modernise their plants. While these 
companies can produce what Samsung 
requires, their costs are too high owing to 
their manual processes, and so they must 
implement automatic systems in order to 
improve productivity. Although foreign-
invested sectors accounted for about 
70 percent of Vietnam’s total exports, 
they remained limited added value.
To attract more global production, 
Southeast A sia must raise labour 
productivity. A McKinsey report put 
the annual manufacturing output per 
worker in 2012 at US$3,800 in 
Vietnam, as compared to US$14,200 
in Indonesia, US$21,200 in Thailand, 
US$33,200 in Malaysia and US$57,100 
in China. For companies looking to 
set up shop, these statistics negate any 
advantage of cheap labour that Vietnam 
may have to offer. One of the main reasons 
that labour productivity in Vietnam is so 
low is because the share of agricultural 
and informal household industries is still 
very high, at 20 percent and 30 percent 
of output respectively. Moreover, informal 
households are not very competitive as 
they lack access to capital for investing in 
training or IT, and pay little adherence 
to corporate governance. Vietnam must 
turn these households into a registered 
formal private sector (which only makes up 
12 percent of industry), and a lso 
develop agriculture to accommodate 
large-scale production. 
Moreover, Vietnamese businesses 
must be linked to the global value chain. 
Vietnam has been quickly integrating 
into the world economy, but has not 
j o i n e d  t h e  v a l u e  c h a i n .  F o r 
example, the country exports fish, 
but  not  f ish-derived products. 
So the problem is now to reorganise 
the economy such that the agenda in 
Vietnam is not only institutional and 
market reforms, but also policies aimed 
at  restructuring the economy. 
If Vietnam wants to truly prosper, the 
country must transition from a low 
labour cost economy to one based 
on science and technology in order 
to produce high-value products and 
services. The farmers must be trained, 
ranked 68 
on the World Economic 
Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index 
for 2014 to 2015
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organised and equipped to capture 
economies of scale and move up the value 
chain. Policymakers must accept market 
discipline and stand by their commitments.
Similarly, I believe that international 
integration, including that with the AEC, 
will be the necessary external pressure 
that pushes for internal restructuring and 
reform in Vietnam. And it will apply not 
only to the public institutions, but also to 
every sector and society as a whole. We 
are talking not only about education, but 
also say, vocational training or any other 
imaginable mechanism to further develop 
human capital.
The Vietnamese government has 
recognised the problem and shown 
determination to deal with it—as it looks 
at streamlining the bureaucracy and 
improving the role of civil society and 
that of responsible mass media, which 
can act as a constructive and yet critical 
counterpart of government. Social media 
and mobile connectivity is another 
channel that is key to democratising and 
creating these kinds of discussions. 
Especially when one considers Vietnam’s 
34 million and growing Facebook users 
who typically access the network via 
their smartphones.
Optimism for the future
If one looks at other transition economies 
such as Mongolia and Cuba, it becomes 
apparent that Vietnam is relatively 
advanced in terms of implementing 
internal reforms and integrating with the 
rest of the world. Further integration will 
require new standards on fair competition 
and transparency from the government. 
If you look at Vietnam’s history, reform 
was the product of a survival strategy. 
Vietnam is still a one-party communist 
country, and there continues to be a 
debate on how people can raise their 
voice and contribute to the reform of 
institutions, improving transparency, 
o p e n n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . 
Reform has been a gradual process— 
one of learning by doing. But we cannot 
relax. Economic growth is stagnating 
and Vietnam is growing below its potential. 
Restructuring and reform of the economy 
must be urgently implemented. 
I am optimistic about the future, and 
believe that if Vietnam can ignite the 
creativity and dynamism of its people, 
miracles can be achieved. There are 
many excellent people in the business 
community here, and if there is a 
restructuring of the business process, 
monitoring of monopolies and controlling 
of vested interest groups, Vietnam 
should be well set to prosper and take 
great advantage of its integration into the 
world economy.
